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The failure or distress of a number of Greek industrial firms has
hurt Greek banking - and reform of Greece's financial system
is a prerequisite for industrial restructuring.
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Since the late  1970s,  industrial activity  in  * Reduction of the public deficit and  the
Greece has been deteriorating  rapidly.  An  public  sector borrowing requirement  (progress
increasing number of industrial firms have  on this front is expected  to be slow).
experienced distress and failure.
* Modemization of banking  activities, par-
About 40 percent of manufacturing  enter-  ticularly of portfolio management  capabilities.
prises reported losses during 1979-86.  Since
1982, the manufacturing industry overall has  * Prudential regulation  and supervision of
reported a negative net income.  banking, aimed at restorinb  investor confidence
through more transparent activities.
Because of their extensive indebtedness, the
widespread  distress of industrial companies has  * A stronger capital  market, with more
affected the soundness of Greek banks - tradable bonds and other securities and eventual
especially the state-controlled commercial  banks  reorganization  of the stock market.
that account for more than 70 percent of Greek
deposit and  loan markets.  Industrial restructuring
The financial position of Greek banks has  * Repayment of the foreign debt of problem-
been further undermined  by large losses in non-  atic companies through the Business Recon-
manufacturing  companies - especially con-  struction Organization (OAE).
struction  and engineering.
* Repayment of domestic debt through  a
Distress and failure in Greek industrial firms  combination of methods.
must be d  alt with through broad macroecon-
omic,  financial, and  industrial reform.  Antonia-  * Systematic liquidation of nonviable compa-
des aixi Kouzionis outline the main goals or  nies.
targets of reform in three  areas:
* Restructuring  of problematic  but viable
Macroeconomic reform  companies.  Sometimes this means consolida-
tion, but often - particularly  in one large textile
* Reducing inflation and the public deficit.  company - it means breaking the company up
into smaller, more flexible units.
Financial  reform
* Free interest rates determined by market
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suggestions.INTRODUCTION
Since  the  late  1970s,  a  large  number  of  Greek  industrial
companies have been characterized by  financial  distress.  At the
same  time,  the  financial  indicators  describing  the  country's
industrial  activity  have  deteriorated  rapidly.  The  financial
crisis ha3 manifested itself in the following forms:
(1)  An average of about 40%  of the total number of manufacturing
enterprises have been reporting losses during the 1979-1986 period.
At a sector level,  nearly half of manufacturing sectors  (9  out of
20,  following  the  classification  of  the  National  Statistical
Service)  have  been  loss-making  on  average.  Since  1982,  Greek
manufacturing industry has been reporting a negative net income on
an aggregate basis.1
(2)  New investment  in  fixed assets has been relatively low with
obvious  detrimental  effects  on  the  modernization  of  industrial
capacity,  productivity,  and competitiveness.  In 11 out of the 20
manufacturinq  sectors  the  net  value  of  fixed  assets  (after
depreciation and in constant 1979 prices)  has decreased.
(3)  A considerable number of firms  have been  reporting negative
equity  capital  as  a result of  accumulated  losses.  A number  of
incentives  provided  by  the  government  to  encourage  investment
financed by equity capital has had only moderate success.
(4)  Some  of  the  biggest  loss-making  firms  have  continued
operations  despite  serious  structural  problems,  because  of
considerations unrelated to efficiency and future prospects  (e.g.
employment,  balance of payments considerations,  links with  other
companies,  etc.).
(5)  At  the  end  of  1986  there  were  over  3,000  manufacturing
enterprises in Greece.  They had total assets of nearly GRD 2,500
1 Some  estimates  suggest  positive  aggregate  net  industrial
income for 1986.  The apparent discrepancy is  due to the  sampling
methods  employed.  In our analysis we  follow the data  provided by
the Confederation of Greek Industries (SEB).  Preliminary estimates
for 1987 suggest positive net aggregate income for industry, though
a considerable  number  of  companies  and  some  industrial  sectors
continued to report losses.
ILbillion, book equity of GRD 400 billion and total debt of GRD 2,100
billion.  Bank credit to the manufacturing sector amounted to GRD
1,300 billion.  This compared with a book equity of less than GRD
loo billion for all Creek banks,  although the banks have extensive
hidden  reserves  in  undervalued  property  and  shareholdings  in
profitable companies.
(6)  Because of their extensive indebtedness to the banking sector,
the widespread  distress  of  industrial  companies  has  an  adverse
impact on the soundness of Greek banks,  especially the major state-
controlled commercial banks that account  for over 70  per cent of
the Greek deposit and loan markets.
(7)  The  Greek  authorities  have  classified  44  manufacturing
companies as "problematic".  These had in 1986 total assets of GRD
220 billion,  debt  of GRD 350 billion and  negative book equity  of
GRD 130  billion.  Bank loans amounted to GRD 190 billion.  These
companies  represent  15%  of  the  total  debt  of  manufAc&  ring
industry.  However,  several  other  companies  that  ha  een
suffering  losses have not been classified as  "problematic" e-her
because  they were  small  or  because they were  affiliated  to,  and
thus supported by,  the main banks or because they were supported
directly by the State.
(8)  The  financial  position  of  Greek  banks  has  been  further
undermined by large losses suffered by non-manufacturing companies,
especially in the construction and engineering sectors.  They also
have  a  considerable  exposure  to  loss-making  public  sector
enterprises and other entities,  although this is  covered by state
guarantees.
(9)  Greek  banks  have  taken  several  steps  to  deal  with  this
problem.  They  have  suspended  the  accrual  of  interest  on  non-
performing loans, have converted some of the debt into equity, have
rescheduled the remaining debt a;id  in some cases have provided new
loans.  The  recent  recovery  of  corporate  profitability  and  the
strong  performance  of  the  Athens  Stock  Exchange  have  slightly
reduced  the  intensity  of  the problem.  Banks have  been  able  to
cover some of their losses on industrial lending from profits from
their other operations.  Nevertheless,  much remains to be done to
restructure  or  close  down  industrial  companies  in  distress  and
remove their burden from the banks.
2This  paper  discusses  the  extent  and  causes  of  financial
distress in Greek industry and the importance of its impact on the
banking system and the country's economy.  It also reviews recent
approaches developed to resolve the crisis and the results achieved
so far.
3EXTENT OF PXNANCXAL DISTRES8
Brief  Historical Reviex
The first signs of financial distress in Greece became evident
during the  late  1970s  (effectively after  1977),  when a number of
big,  mainly  industrial,  firms  declared  their  inability  to  meet
their due obligations. The problem was not initially considered as
particularly  threatening  and  was  attributed  to  the  two  energy
crises and to management inefficiencies of the specific firms.
In the early 1980s,  faced with an increasing number of ailing
firms,  the  government  decided  to  intervene  and  implement  new
policies for  industrial restructuring.  In 1983,  Law No.  1386/1983
was passed  specifyirng the terms under which ailing firms would be
taken over and their management transferred to the public sector.
The Business Reconstruction organization  (OAE)  was set up,  with a
capital  of  5 billion GRD subscribed by the  State,  to handle the
situation.  The Organization was also given access to bank credit
for any necessary additional  funds.
According  to  the  law's  provisions,  shareholders,  major
creditors,  employees ana other interested parties were entitled to
apply for protection once a firm's insolvency could be established.
Once  an  application  was  approved,  the  firm  was  officially
characterized  as  "problematic"  with  the  following  immediate
consequences:
- New management was  appointed by the OAE.
- A 36-month grace period was declared,  during which principal
and  interest  payments  were  suspended  (interest  payments
continued  to  be  charged  to  the  accounts  of  the  firms  but
actual payments were postponed).
- A rehabilitation procedure was undertaken and the  new Board
of Directors would decide on the necessary meisures.  At  the
same  time  the  overall  viability  of  the  firm  was  to  be
assessed.
- If the firm was considered non-viable,  a liquidation process
was to commence.  Otherwise a restructuring program would be
immediately applied, involving a  compulsory increase of equity
capital  by  the  present  shareholders,  conversion  of part  of
debt to equity and rescheduling of the remaining debt.
4Over 250 applications were considered during 1983-87,  and 46
of  them were  approved.  Before  falling  under  Law  1386/83  the  44
firms  (excluding  the  two  firms  registered  after  December  1986)
employed over 30,000 people and their liabilities amounted to 230.5
billion  GRD2 of  which  158.9  billion  to  banks.  Liabilities  to
foreign creditors (denominated in foreign currency)  were estimated
at about 40 billion GRD,  while acci  lated losses had reached the
level of  .10 billion GRD.
The  organizational  and  financial  structures  and  the market
prospects for each of the firms were examined,  and companies were
then  classified  as  either  "viable"  or  "non-viable".  The  former
group  included  23  firms  and the  latter  213.  At  the end  of  1987
legal  liquidation procedures had already started for most  of  the
"non-viable"  firms.  For  the  "viable"  firms  the  restructuring
procedure  was  put  in  effect  and  they  are  continuing  operations
under new management.
While the major part of the operation is still under way,  some
progress has already been evidenced during the last two years.  In
1986  the  viable  firms  reported  a  positive  aggregate  operating
income of 8.7 billion drachmas compared to a  2.6 billion loss  in
1983. The improvement has been due to both increased net sales  (145
billion GRD,  85% higher than three years earlier) and reduced costs
(the  gross  profit  margin  increased  from  11%  to  about  18%).  The
provisional  results  for  1987  show a  further  improvement,  as  the
firms started enjoying the benefits of the financial restructuring.
However,  some  of  the  biggest  (and  most  important,  from  the
creditors' point of view) companies continued to accumulate losses,
suggesting  that  further,  and  possibly  more  drastic,  action  is
required.
2OECD  - "Economic  Surveys,  Greece,  1986-87",  p.35.  Data
supplied  by  I.Mantagos,  President  of  OAE  to  "Economic  Post"
(01/08/88)  suggest a total amount of liabilities of 173.6 billion.
The difference must be attributable either to the number of firms
included in the estimates and/or to the point in time chosen.
3Three more companies had thei  applications submitted after
31/12/86,  so their viability had r.ot  been assessed at that time.
One of them has now been effectively classified  as viable,  while
the viability of two of tne initial 23 has been reconsidered. Thus
the number of viable firms stood in September 1988  at 22.
5The Burden of NProblematia" Firms
The importance of the distress of "problematic" firms is shown
in Table 1  which presents the basic financial  indicators of Greek
manufacturing  industry.  The  problematic  firms  are  big business
units,  constituting  a  substantial  component  of  the  country's
industrial network.  Thus,  though representing  less than 2% of the
total number of industrial companies,  they employ 7.2% of the total
labor force  (9.3%  in 1981)  and 11.5% of productive capacity (fixed
assets).  Their  average capital  is  about  seven  times bigger  than
that of the Ether industrial  firms.
Moreover,  the problematic  firms have absorbed  a substantial
part of total  credit outstanding in the eccnomy,  both before and
after the commencing of the restructuring effort  (their share  in
total liabilities outstanding was 15.4% and 17% at the end of 1981
and 1986 respectively). To complete the picture one would also have
to  consider  the  amount  of  debt  converted  to  equity  (about  62
billion GRD)  and other transfers of  funds  (from banks,  the State,
etc.)  in the form of new equity contributions.
Consderin-  their  extcsivc  lirs  with  ather paa-tb  of GLeek
industry, the problematic firms probably had an adverse  impact on
over a quarter of  the country's  industry.  The picture was even
worse  in  some  sectors.  Had the  problematic  firms  been  left  to
declare bankruptcy and cease operations,  the paper industry would
have lost 60% of its productive capacity,  55% of its production and
75%  of its exports. The respective figures for the cement industry
would have been about 40-45%.
However  impressive,  these  numbers  do  not  capture  all  the
dimensions of  the problem  because  they  fail  to  account  for  some
even  more  important  consequences.  In  an  industry  of  relatively
small  size  (such  as  the  Greek  industry),  the  failure  of  firms
considered, by Greek standards,  as "giants" entails much more harm
than may be perceived at first glance.  The problematic firms were
supposed to be the country's leaders in the industrial development
effort,  paving  the  path  for  new  investment  ventures.  They  were
supposed to be the "importers" of advanced technology,  management
techniques,  and business ideas.  By failing to assume such a role
they contributed to a poor investment climate, destroyed the image
of the Greek industry and reduced the attractiveness of the economy
6THE IMPORTANCE OF PROBLEMATIC FTRMS
IN GREEK INDUSTRY
1981  Number  Total  Fixed  Liabi-  Emplo-
of.Firms  Assets  Assets  lities  yment
(GRD bn)  (GRD bn)  (GRD bn)  (OOOs)
Total Industry  3074  937.1  351.0  750.8  355.3
Problematic  44  116.2  71.5  115.3  33.0
% Problematic  1.4  12.4  20.4  15.4  9.3
1986  Number  Total  Fixed  Liabi-  Emplo-
of Firms  Assets  Assets  lities  yment
(GRD bn)  (GRD bn)  (GRD bn)  (OOOS)
Total Industry  3263  2428.2  877.7  2069.8  390.3
Problematic  44  219.1  100.7  349.6  28.0
of which
Viable  23  188.6  83.1  250.7  26.1
Non-Viable  21  30.5  17.6  98.9  1.9
% Problematic  1.3  9.0  11.5  16.9  7.2
Source:  Confederation of Greek Industrialists - The Greek
Industry 1987
OECD Economic Surveys - Greece 1986-87
7to potential  foreign investors.  Moreover,  through their backward
and forward links to all other sectort of the economy, they created
severe  problems  for  a number  of  small  enterprises  cooperating
withand  depending  on  them.  Thus,  they  share  considerable
responsibility for the unfavorable results of the Greek economy in
recent years.  Finally,  by  absorbing  a great  part  of  the  credit
flows  to  industry,  they  prevented  the  development  of  other,
possibly more efficient,  activities.
Oectoral Distribution of Distressad Companies
While  Greek  industry has,  in  general,  been  facing  problems
throughout  thxe  period  examined,  some  manufacturing  sectors were
hit harder by  the crisis.  Table 2  summarizes the importance anc
experience of different sectors.
Tranegortation.  With the automobile industry at its infant stages,
the core of the sector is the ship-building industry.  Performance
has been particularly poor during the 1980s, with an average of 50%
of  the  companies  making  losses  (60%  in  1985)  and  9% declaring
bankruptcy. From 1979 to 1986 the sector has been suffering losses,
cumulatively  amounting  to  over  40  billion  GRD.  There  are  no
companies  officially  registered  as  problematic  in  the  sector,
though some of its biggest units have clearly been under financial
distress for a number of years.  All of the biggest four companies
of the sector reported losses  in  1986  (12  billion GRD in total),
while three of them, accounting for about 21% of the sector's total
capacity, can be safely described as ailing.  The largest companies
in the sector have close links with the leading banks or directly
with the state.
Non-metallic minerals manufacturing.  The sector  includes glass,
cement,  ceramic  and  marble  industries,  while  mining  non-
manufacturing  industries  are  also  usually  classified  here.
Distressed companies account for more than a third of the sector's
total  productive  capacity.  The  sector has  registered  the  lowest
average annual return on equity,  althoujh returns on total capital
employed have been above average.  The  ,'jllapse of the Middle East
markets  in  the  early  1980s  and  the  depression  of  domestic
investment have contributed to the sector's difficulties.  Due to
a very slow rate of new  equity contributions  (in 1985 the aggregate
equity capital of the sector was negative),  and very high leverage
ratios,  total  financial expenses increased by 10 times from 1979
8TABL-
IMPORTANCE OF DISTRESSED SECTORS
(shares of total manufacturing)
Sector  employment  capital  production  credit
Transportation  11  9  4  -
Non-metallic  6  - 6  8
minerals
Paper  2  3  2  5
Wood,  cork  9  2  2  3
and furniture
Basic metals and  9  15  2  3
metal products
Textiles  14  14  13  15
Causes of distress:
1) Transportation:  European-wide decline of sector
2) Non-metallic  Financial  structure;  high leverage;
minerals  foreign competition
3) Paper  Over-optimistic investments in the 1970s;
high leverage
4) Wood,  cork and  Construction-industry recession;
furniture  competition from substitutes  (plastic,
aluminum);  small scale of units
5) Basic metals and  Construction-industry recession;
metal products  competition from NICs;  quotas
imposed by the EC
6) Textiles  International competition
9to  1986,  while the  gross margin increased by  3.5 times  (not much
below  average).  A  subatantial  part  of  the  sector's  equity  is
nowowned by the banks  (mainly the National Bank which is by far the
largest commercial bank in the country).
The  cement  industry  has  demonstrated  a substantial  revival
recertly,  mostly  due  to  increased exports  to  European Community
countries.  New 0,.portunities will emerge once the construction of
planned  major  domestic  projects  (Athens  subway,  airport  etc.)
begins.
The  Pager  Industry.  All  performance  indicators  for  the  period
examined have been particularly poor.  From 1979 to 1986 the sector
has  been accumulating  losses  continually,  cumulatively amounting
to more than 45 billion GRD.
Due to heavy losses at the beginning of the 1980s the sector's
equity capital has been wiped out and.  since 1984,  firms have been
operating  entirely  on  borrowed  funds.  As  a  result,  financial
expenses have grown by 10 times and about 75% of gross margins are
absorbed by interest pdyments. During this period,  new investment
in fixed assets has been the lowest of all manufacturing sectors,
while  production  has  been  growing  at  rates  well  above  average.
Probably because of the influential newspaper owners,  the industry
was not allowed to  raise  its prices  to cover  its high  operating
costs. The paper industry is the only manufacturing sector yielding
a negative return on total capital employed.
Wood,  Cork  and  Furniture  Industries.  These  two  "traditional"
sectors have been performing poorly durirg the last decade, making
losses  continually  after  1982.  Nearly half  of  the  units  in  the
sector have been persistently making losses and an average of about
20%  has  been declaring  bankruptcy.  However,  because  the  initial
capital  requirements  are  fairly  small,  new  undertakings  have
entered the market. Nevertheless,  the aggregate performance of the
sector has not improved.
In both industries,  investment in fixed assets has been
well below average and produc';ion has been falling.  The sector is
not highly leveraged and financial expenses do not pose a  problem
to profitability.  Production has been almost entirely directed to
the domestic market  (less than 1.5%  of output is  exported),  while
competition from imports has sha.rpened lately.
10BaAic Metal Manufacturinq and Metal Products.  All financial ratios
have been steadily deteriorating after 1979.  Due to the importance
of the two sectors for the national economy, six of the biggest and
worst  performing  units  have  been  officially  characterized  as
"problematic" and registered with the OAE.  Today only one of them
is  considered  to be  viable.  Another big non-problematic  firm is
under financial distress.
Despite  fairly  large  new  investments,  production  has  been
fluctuating in response to changing circumstances (a  30% drop from
1979 to 1982 was followed by a strong revival until 1985 and a new
drop in 1986).
In contrast with the big size of basic metal industries,  the
average size of units engaged in secondary metal manufacturing is
small,  even  by  Greek  standards.  This  does  not  facilitate  the
necessary  technological  and  organizational  modernization  of
operations. The aluminum manufacturing units seem to have the best
prospects. The rest will require closures and/or mergers with basic
metal manufacturing units aiming at  integration of production.
Textiles.  The textile  industry  ir one  of  the most  "traditional"
Greek  industrial  sectors  and,  in  terms of  the  average number of
units  operating  between  1979-1986,  the  biggest  manufacturing
sector. After a prolonged period of rapid development,  the sector
faced  serious  financial  problems  for  a decade  or  so,  before
exhibiting  an  impressive  recovery  in  1986  (return  of  capital
employed in 1986 was 15.1%,  the highest  in manufacturing).  In the
meantime a  number of textile industries  had been under  financial
distress and 13 of them registered with the OAE  (seven are viable).
The  viable  firms,  including  the biggest  problematic  and  fourth
biggest industrial  company,  account for about 22%  of the sector's
productive  capacity.  Despite the general  recovery of  the sector,
these  firms  continued accumulating  losses  in  1986,  amounting to
more than 7 billion GRD.
The  sector's  fundamental  problem  has  been  international
competition.  While textile exports grew by 4.3 times between  1979
and 198a, imports grew by 13.7 times. The share of output directed
to foreign markets increased only slightly  (from 20%  to 24%),  but
the domestic market has been  increasingly penetrated by imported
products,  the share of which  in domestic sales  increased  from 7%
to 23%.
11CAUSES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS
The causes of financial distress could be roughly classified
in  three major  categories,  macroeconomic,  industry-specific  and
firm-specific.
Macroeconomia Factors
Macroeconomic  instability  manifested  in  high  inflation  and
large public sector deficits has adversely affected Greek industry,
first by raising domestic demand to unsustainable levels and then
by the depressing effect of anti-inflation stabilization measures.
Fluctuations  in the  real exchange rate,  caused by high inflation
and  delayed  discrete  devaluations,  undermined  its  international
competitiveness.  The vast public sector deficits also caused an
increase  in  real  interest  rates,  which  coupled  with  depressed
levels of domestic demand,  discouraged investment.
Bector-specific causes
Many factors have had a negative impact on different sectors
of  Greek  industry.  Energy-consuming  sectors  such  as  cement and
metal  industries  were  seriously  affected  by  the  rise  in  energy
prices in the  1970s and early  1980s,  although  the  fall  in energy
prices  in  the  mid-1980s  stimulated  a partial  recovery  of  their
fortunes.  Highly-leveraged  sectors experienced a large  increase
in their finance expenses  following the  rise  in the real  cost of
bank loans.  Sectors producing  consumer goods  suffered  from the
fall  of  domestic demand  as  well  as  from  the  reduction  of  trade
protection  that  followed  Greece's  entry  into  the  European
Community.  Sectors  exporting  to  oil-producing  countries  were
adversely hit by the collapse of  the  economies  of most  of these
countries  in  the  early  1980s.  The  performance  of  medium  and
high-technology manufacturing  sectors  (chemicals,  mechanical  and
industrial  equipment,  transportation)  suffered  from  lack  of
investment  and  modernization.  With  the  exception  of  some
individual  achievements  in  exports,  lack  of  the  necessary
technological  background  and  experience  has  prevented  the
development  of  a  high  technology  industry  with  good  export
prospects.
12Greek  manufacturing  has  failed  to  adjust  to  changing
circumstances  in international  trade and to take advantage of the
opening of the EC market.  The low technology and labor-intensive
industries are facing  strong competition  from Eastern Europe and
the  newly  industrializing  countries,  while  medium  and  high
technology sectors continue to lag behind their EC competitors.
Causes sRecific to distressed comRanies
Further to the macroeconomic and sector-specifi. influences,
there  is  evidence that  there  exist  causes  of  financial  distress
which are specific to some distressed companies or to small groups
of companies. Most of them relate to management  (i.e.  they are the
outcome of erroneous decisions made at a top-management level)  or
to  deficiencies  in  production,  financial,  and  information
structures.
Inadequate management.  A considerable number of Greek firms does
not employ professional managers.  Firms are administered by their
owners,  who  in  many  cases  lack  the  appropriate  background,
qualifications and managerial experience.  The absence of a clear
separation between management  and ownership  is the result of the
small size and family structure of a great number of enterprises.
Inadequate  organizational  structures.  In  many  cases  where
professionals  have  been  appointed  to  exercise  top-management
functions,  responsibility  lines  have  not  been  clearly  drawn,
resulting in the absence of management specialization and disputes
at managerial  level.
Incomplete or misleading accountina and information systems.
The primary function of accounting in Greece has been to serve tax
purposes,  often  with  a  view  to  evading  taxes,  ignoring  the
informational content of accounting figures.  Accounting standards
and  disclosure  requirements  are  underdeveloped,  substantially
reducing the potential  for the use  of accounting  information  for
decision making. The use of other information systems has also been
limited to a number of big firms. Thus,  important information about
consumer preferences,  competition,  and general market trends has
been ignored. As a consequence, many companies have been surprised
or  even  overwhelmed  by  developments  which  should  have  been
anticipated.
13Over-0Dtiuiutic investments.  Because of incomplete or non-existent
information  systems,  some  big  investments  were  made  without
reference to competition and market conditions.  There is evidence
that  this  phenomenon  has  played  a major  role  in  the  cases  of
"problematic" breweries and paper-manufacturing  firms. Furthermore,
because of existing regulatory rigidities (especially in the labor
market),  over-optimistic investments eventually resulted in under-
utilization of capital  and human resources,  which persisted  even
after expectations were proved wrong.
over-dependence  on  the domestic market.  Trade protectionism has
caused  many  industrial  companies  to  depend  exclusively  on  the
domestic market.  As a result,  they have resisted modernization of
activities,  imr  ovements in productivity and competitiveness,  and
attempts  to  expand  their  market  shares  abroad.  Most  of  these
companies came under  financial distress when trade  barriers were
further removed  following Greece's entry in the EC in 1981.
Deliberate  mismanagement.  There  is  a widespread  belief  in  the
country  that  some  owners  of  big  industrial  units  deliberately
mismanaged their firms in order to take funds out of the corporate
sector and,  usually,  out of the country.  In some cases such views
were also officially expressed  (e.g.  by the Minister of National
Economy,  M.Drettakis  in  the  budget  introductory  report  to  the
Parliament,  1982).  The debate over the extent to which deliberate
mismanagement has contributed to financial distress in industry is
still going on.  There  is evidence that such cases  related mostly
to over-leveraged firms and that their owners had applied for  (and
in some cases were granted)  large loans while preparing to declare
bankruptcy.  The  inadequacy  of  bank  control  systems  to  monitor
debtors (credit analysis criteria were often replaced by "personal
relations")  certainly bears part of the blame.
14IMPACT  ON THE 01%EK  BANKING  SYSTEM
Because of the underdevelopment of the securities markets and
nonbank financial intermediaries,  such as life insurance companies
and pension funds,  the banking sector has been called upon to play
a  major part in the financing of the growing public sector deficits
and  in  channelling  financial  resources  to  industry  and  other
priority  sectors.  Although  there  has  been  some  relaxation  of
credit  controls  in  recent years,  government  intervention  in  the
financial  system  has  been  very  extensive  and  has  included  the
imposition of large compulsory deposits at the Bank of Greece and
compulsory  investments  in  treasury  bills  (over  40  per  cent  in
recent years),  application of  quotas on bank lending in  favor of
certain  productive  sectors  end  state  utilities,  central  bank
determination  of  the  structure  of  interest  rates  and  a complex
system of blocking and deblocking of reserves against loans,  aimed
at raising the effective return to banks of low-interest loans to
high priority  sectors and  lowering the  effective return of high-
interest loans to nonpriority sectors.
Extensive  Controls
Being the primary financier of Greek economic activity,  the
banking  system  has  played  a substantial  role  in  the  country's
development  and  the banks have  usually absorbed a great part  of
business risk.  As a result of regulated credit allocation,  some
activities of the private sector were given better access to bank
credit  than  others.  Thus,  though  commerce  has  been  the  most
profitable  activity  for  a long  period,  its  share  in  total  bank
credit outstanding was reduced from 9.1% at the end of 1979 to 5.6%
at  the  end  of  1986,  while  agriculture  increased  its  share  from
16.5% to 17.3%.  Manufacturing has been the activity most favored
by the system although  its  share of total credit fell  from 40.9%
to 36.1% between 1979 and 1986.  Reflecting the need to finance the
borrowing requirements of public utilities and other public sector
entities,  credit to the public sector expanded from 12.5% to 24.2%
of the total.  The expansion of public sector borrowing adversely
affected  manufacturing  industries  although  the  demand  for  funds
from  industry  has  been  subdued  because  of  the  slowdown  of
investment activity.  In fact,  distress borrowing accounted for a
substantial part of new credit to industry.
15Though operating in a highly regulated environment, the banks
themselves  bear  a  substantial  part  of  the  responsibility  for
granting loans to poorly performing companies.  As a general rule,
political  influences  replaced  objective  criteria  in  credit
allocation  decisions  througliout  the  postwar  period.  Whether
government intervention or the banks themselves are most to blame
for  the  irrational  and  inefficient  credit  allocation  remains  a
controversial  issue.  What is not controversial  is that loans have
been granted to companies without any reference to their business
performance. The results of such a practice are always more likely
to  show  up at  times  of  unfavorable economic  circumstances;  they
have  been  strongly  felt  by  the  banks  during the  late  1970s  and
througl.out the 1980s.
The  exac'  amount  of  non-performing  loans  is  not  easy  to
assess, both t  cause of difficulties in classifying loans as "bad"
and  "non-bad",  in  the  legal  sense  of  the  term,  and  because  of
business confidentiality. A rough estimate of the magnitude of the
problem is,  perhaps,  reported by the banks in their annual reports
(figures on "provisions for bad debt,  etc.").  The 1987  figures for
the three major state-controlled banks and the private commercial
banks are presented in Table 3. The National Bank has "provisions"
amounting  to  GRD  39  billion  or  93%  of  its  equity  base  (share
capital and reserves).
However, reported "provisions for bad debt" grossly understate
the  real  magnitude  of  non-peirforming  loans,  as  they  are  also
affected  by  each  bank's  financial  accounting  policies  and  by
regulatory requirements regarding the classification of loans. The
1987 report of the National Bank stated that it had converted non-
performing loans of 122 billion drachmas into equity and had also
suspended interest accrual on another 100 billion.
The  big  state-controlled  banks  have  often  been  called  to
participate  in  efforts  to  rescue  enterprises  under  financial
distress,  when the latter were deemed to be of primary importance
to  the  country's  economy  and  social  welfare.  The  banks  became
involved in such operations either as a result of their financial
or ownership relations with the distressed firms  (for example,  the
ex-Andreadis  group  companies  that  came  under  Commercial  Bank
control)  or acting as representatives of the State.  In some cases
they were directed to provide successive injections of new credit
to firms performing poorly,  even though the latter were about to
16TABLE 3
PROVISIONS FOR BAD DEBT OF MAJOR COMMERCIAL BANKS,  1987
(in  million  drachmas)
PROVISIONS  EQUITY  LOANS  P/E%  P/L%
NATIONAL  39185  42023  894409  93.25  4.38
COMMERCIAL  9714  22305  289284  43.55  3.36
IONIAN  3208  10236  144780  31.34  2.22
CREDIT  2200  7364  141496  29.88  1.55
GENERAL  936  1866  54188  50.16  1.73
ERGOBANK  845  3377  44902  25.02  1.88
TOTAL  56088  87171  1569059  64.34  3.57
Source  :  Annual  Bank Reports  (1987)
17declare  bankruptcy.  Also,  a number of big  industrial  firms were
effectively subsidized by their creditors (banks) long before their
distress  was  officially  recognized.  Though  their  financial
performance was foretelling serious problems since the mid-1970s,
they  were  granted  new  credit  on  social,  political  or  other
noneconomic  grounds.  Such  firms  soon  became  insolvent  and
over-indebted to the barking system at the beginning of the 1980s.
R2scue ODerations
When  the  problem  of  industrial  distress  broke  out  and  the
Business Reconstruction Corporation  (OAE)  was established to cope
with it, the  banks were  once again  called  to participate  in and
share  the  risk  of  the  restructuring  process.  The  bulk  of  this
burden was undertaken by the National  Bank,  while the Commercial
and  Ionian  Banks  were  also called to  share.  Their participation
involved the conversion of part of loans to equity often at book
value rather than realistic market values,  extensive rescheduling
of loans,  including a three year postponement of debt service,  and
provision of new financial support.
Because of their role  in  supporting ailing companies,  banks
have  undermined  considerably  the  soundness  of  their  investment
portfolios.  Table  4  presents  data  on  the  composition  of  the
investment  portfolios  of  the  three  major  banks  (National,
Commercial and Ionian)  in 1987.  Their major holdings  (over 5% of
each Bank's own funds)  are shown in Table 5.
The National  Bank has  clearly assumed the major role  in the
industrial  restructuring  process,  as  it  has  invested  almost two
times its equity capital in industrial companies, the greatest part
of  it  in ailing ones.  Its  10 biggest holdings,  representing  157%
of its equity base,  are in major industrial firms which have been
consistently making losses since the beginning of the crisis. Most
of these companies have  had their  equity wiped out  by losses or
have  proceeded  to  new  equity  subscriptions.  The  sole  (or  main)
subscriber has been the National Bank.  In addition, the Bank holds
65.6 billion drachmas in bonds issued by the OAE and guaranteed by
the State,  as part of the problematic firms'  debt restructuring.
The  Commercial  and  Ionian  Bank  (both  belonging  to  the
Commercial Bank Group)  have also taken some,  though much smaller,
part in industrial restructuring. The most important burden of the
18TABLE 4
OBLIGATIONS OF PROBLEMATIC FIRMS,  1986
Viable  Non-Viable  Total
To Banks
(a)"Old" i.e  loans granted before
OAE assumed management  91.4  62.7  154.1
(b)"New"  32.2  0.5  32.7
Total  123.6  63.2  186.8
To the State and Insurance Funds
(a)"Old"  10.0  9.5  19.5
(b)"New"  5.3  0.9  6.2
To OAE  41.6  13.9  55.3
Total  56.9  24.3  81.0
Total Outstanding  180.5  87.5  267.8
of which "Old"  101.4  72.5  173.6
"New"  79.1  15.0  94.2
Source:  Interview of President of OAE "Economi. Post",  August
11,  1988).
19group  is  the  "Elefsina  Ship-Building  Company",  which  is  not
officially registered as "problematic" but,  because of the size of
its  losses  and its  needs for new capital,  poses a serious threat
to the well-being of the group.
Despite the immensity of the problem banks have been able so
far  to  cover  some  of  their  losses  on  industrial, lending  from
profits from their other operations.  The National  Bank was able
in  1987 to realize capital gains of GRD 17  billion on some of its
various shareholdings.  The  recovery of  industrial profitability
and the strong performance of the Athens Stock Exchange have also
contributed  to  a  slight  alleviation  of  the  seriousness  of  the
problem.  However, the banks continue to have non-performing loans
well  in excess of their equity.
20TABLE 5
EQUITY HOLDINGS OF MAJOR GREEK COMMERCIAL BANKS,  1987
A. NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE
EQUITY CAPITAL : 42023 MILLION DRS
Holdings in  Number of  Holdings  % of NBG  % of Total
Companies  Companies  (GRD mn)  Equity  Holdings
1. Non-Industrial
Banks  13  5531  13.16  5.29
Insurance  3  3144  7.48  3.01
Holding  2  5257  12.51  5.03
Real Estate  3  31  0.07  0.03
Tourism  6  7743  18.43  7.41
Commerce,  etc  11  5649  13.44  5.41
Sub-Total  38  27355  65.10  26.17
2. Industrial
Food and Beverages  6  1665  3.96  1.59
Textile  13  33113  78.80  31.68
Paper Industries  5  17939  42.69  17.17
Chemicals  8  5305  12.62  5.08
Non-metal.  Minerals  4  4447  10.58  4.26
Electrical Appl.  3  4432  10.55  4.24
Metal Industries  15  8823  21.00  8.44
Other Industrial  9  1430  3.40  1.37
Sub-Total  63  77154  183.60  73.83
Total Holdings  101  104509  248.69  100.00
of which
"Problematic"  20  65902  156.82  63.06
Industrial  18  65364  155.54  62.54
Non-Industrial  2  538  1.28  0.51
21B.  COMMERCIAL  BANK  OF  GREECE
EQUITY CAPITAL : 22305 MILLION DRS
Holdings in  Number of  Holdings  %  of NBG  %  of Total
Companies  Companies  (GRD mn)  Equity  Holdings
1. Non-Industrial
Banks  11  3506  15.72  17.28
Insurance  4  3115  13.97  15.35
Holding  1  11  0.05  0.05
Other  4  316  1.42  1.56
Sub-Total  20  6948  31.15  34.24
Industrial  na  13343  59.82  65.,6
Total Holdings  na  20291  90.97  100.00
of which
"Problematic"  3  2021  9.06  9.96
Industrial  3  2021  9.06  9.96
Non-Industrial  0  0  0  0
C. IONIAN BANK OF GREECE
EQUITY CAPITAL : 10236 MILLION DRS
Holdings in  Number of  Holdings  % of NBG  % of Total
Companies  Companies  (GRD mn)  Equity  Holdings
1. Non-Industrial
Financial  10  165  1.61  5.09
Other  3  1434  14.01  44.26
Sub-Total  13  1599  15.62  49.35
Industrial  16  1641  16.03  50.65
Total Holdings  29  3240  31.65  100.00
of which
"Problematic"  3  174  1.70  5.37
Industrial  3  174  1.70  5.37
Non-Industrial  0  0  0  0
22TABILE  6
MAJOR INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS
(Holdings over 5% of the Bank's Equity Base)
A. NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE
===a=2====~=  =======
TCOTAL
%  CO'S  %BAb.N  LCSSES
COMPANY  SECTOR  PROBLEMATIC  EQUITY  EQUITY  8:-87
(GRD bn)
PIRAIKI  - PATRAIKI  TEXTILES  YES  30.0  63.2  -22.0
S. MICHAILIDIS  TEXTILES  YES  46.8  5.4  -3.2
MEL  PAPER  YES  27.4  8.1  -8.0
THESSALIFI  P)IPER  YES  29.9  8.7  -9.3
ATHENAIKI  1MDER  YES  33.9  24.9  -15.4
PYRKAL  ME-AL  YES  29.0  10.0  -2.6
HERACLES  CEMENT  YES  9.7  9.6  -9.2
ELINTA  ELECTRICAL  YES  28.9  10.0  -7.2
SKALISTIRIS GROUP  MINERALS  YES  25.0  12.2  -17.4
EPAS  WOOD  YES  36.0  5.2  -5.7
TOTAL  157.3  -99.9
B.  COMMERCIAL  BANK  OF  GREECE
PHOSPHORIC  FERT.  CHEMICAL  NO  62.2  8.3  0.8
ELEFSINA SHIPBDNG  TRANS/TION  NO  65.0  35.9  -10.0
HERACLES  CEMENT  YES  5.7  7.9  -9.2
TOTAL  52.1  -18.4
C.  IONIAN BANK OF GREECE
PHOSPHORIC FERT.  CHEMICAL  NO  27.91  8.13  0.8
ELEFSINA SHIPBDNG TRANS/TION  NO  9.50  3.31  -10.0
TOTAL  11.44  -9.2
Source : Annual Bank reports  (1987)
23PROSPECTS FOR INDUSTRIAL AND FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING
Financial  distress  in  industry  has  been  the  consequence  of
macroeconomic,  financial  and  management  factors  as  well  as  of
interactions among them. A successful resolution of the accumulated
problems  requires  action  in  all  fields  of  economic  and  business
activity in the country.
At a macroeconomic level,  the two major problems are inflation
and the public sector deficits.  Reducing inflation rates to levels
similar to those of other EC countries is a basic pre-condition for
eliminating a number of problems  in the  industrial  and  financial
system and enhancing the  economy's dynamism and  competitiveness.
The  two-year stabilization program made some progress towards this
direction.  Further  reduction  will  depend  heavily  on  the
effectiveness of policies designed to contain the growing deficits
of the public sector.
Financial Reform
It  is  widely accepted  that a major  reform of  the  financial
system  is a necessary precondition  for  industrial  restructuring.
Financial system inefficiencies have been a major factor blocking
efforts to restore industrial sector efficiency.  The 1987 "Report
for  the  Reform  and  Modernization  of  the  Financial  and  Banking
System"  suggested  a  number  of  measures  necess.ary  for  promoting
financial sector efficiency. Since then,  there has been significant
progress  in implementing several of the Report's recommendations.
The main targets of the reform are outlined below:
Interest rates.  The ultimate target  is  completely  free  interest
rates,  determined by market conditions.  Interest rate subsidies
for specific activities (e.g.  agriculture)  will continue for some
time,  but their cost will be transferred to the government budget.
The implementation of these policies  is under way and is expected
to be completed by the end of  1990.
Public  sector  borrowing  recruirement.  The  State  is  expected  to
start applying to the primary market to  finance its capital  needs
(open market operations). All administrative regulations previously
used to serve this purpose are to be gradually abolished. The issue
24of  long-term  (3-15  years)  government bonds  is primarily designed
to serve this process.  However, both the government budget deficit
and the borrowing requirement of the extended public sector need
to be reduced,  though progress on this front is likely to be slow.
Modernization of banking activities.  The  banking system has  to
reform its organizational structures and modernize its activities
in order to facilitate economic and industrial development,  as it
is  (and will  remain  for  long)  the primary  financier  of business
activity and to survive competition from other EC banks and banks
of third countries,  as a result of the expected "completion of the
EC internal market" by 1992.
As  part  of this  modernization  drive,  banks  are  expected to
strengthen  their  portfolio  management  capabilities.  Most  bank
portfolio  holdings  have  been  the  result  of  exceptional
circumstances rather than of deliberate portfolio decisions by the
banks.  Releasing  banks  from  the  responsibility  of managing  such
holdings  (non-profitable in most cases)  is the objective of a plan
designed to transfer them to specialized holding companies.  These
provisions refer to shareholdings in (mostly)  industrial companies,
while participations  in credit institutions will remain under the
direct control of banks.
Prudential regulation and suRervision.  The  role  of  the  Bank  of
Greece  in controlling banking  activity will  be  enhanced and  new
regulations regarding accounting disclosures and the provision of
information to  investors are  to be established.  At the same time
provisions  regarding  the  appraisal  of  solvency  and  liquidity
control of banks are expected to be included in the final draft of
the  EC Second  Banking  Directive,  to  be  completed  by  the  end  of
1989.  All  the above regulations  aim at  securing the transparency
of  banking  activities  and  reinforcing  investor  confidence  in
financial  instruments issued by banks.
Promoting  the  role  of  the  securities  market.  One  of  the  main
targets of financial reform is to enhance the role of the capital
market.  A  series  of  measures  have  Ž'een  proposed  in  order  to
reorganize the stock-market,  to increasa the supply and stimulate
demand  for  securities.  On  the  supply  side,  these  include
increasing  the  issue  of  government  bonds  through  the  capital
market,  introducing  new tradable  securities,  such  as  commercial
paper  and certificates  of deposit,  and  increasing  the supply  of
25corporate and bank bonds,  especially bonds of long-term investment
and  mortgage  banks.  On  the  demand  side,  the  proposed  changes
include  amending  the  existing  tax  legislation  to  establish  a
neutral  tax  system  for  different  financial  assets,  introducing
incentives to insurance companies and funds to assume the role of
institutional  investors  and  incentives  for  foreign  investor
participation in stock market operations.
There is also new legislation regarding the reorganization of
stock  market  operations.  Further  to  those  provisions,  the
establishment of an over-the-counter market and,  at a later stage,
a new stock-exchange in Salonica are under consideration.
In4ustrial  Restructuring
Regarding  the  restructuring  of  industry  the  State  and  the
banks  have  a  prominent  role  to  play  in  resolving  the  issue  of
"problematic" and other distressed firns and assisting industry to
modernize  its  capacity.  Many  of  the  problems  encountered  by
"problematic" companies are of a financial nature.  The financial
restructuring plan that has been implemented so  far  incorporates
the following provisions:
- Debt  to  foreign  banks  is  to  be  repaid  by  the  Business
Reconstruction Organization (OAE),  whose representatives have
already  reached an  agreement  with a consortium  of  banks  in
London.  The  contract  provides  for  a  new  loan  of  US$29.5
million at a rate of 0.5 points over LIBOR and a 5-year grace
period.  The major part of the amount  (about 24 million)  will
be treated as a loan granted by OAE to the  distressed firms
and repaid within 8 years,  while the rest will be converted
to equity owned by the Organization.
- Similar settlements have been made regarding the debt of the
problematic firms to foreign suppliers and the debt of Greek
banks  to  foreign  banks  for  loans  taken  on  behalf  of
problematic firms.  About US$50 million will be repaid in this
manner.
- Debt  to  domestic  creditors  (suppliers,  public  utilities,
insurance  funds,  etc.)  is  to be  repaid by a  combination  of
methods,  such as cash provided by OAE  (for 25% of total debt)
shares,  bonds issued by OAE and guaranteed by the State,  etc.
Similar provisions are applied on debt to Greek banks.
26Further  to  the  above  settlements,  new  subscriptions  to  the
equity capital of the profitable problematic  firms are expected,
where  necessary.  For  the  six  firms  listed  in  the  Athens  Stock
Exchange, new shares will be sold through the capital market, while
the procedure for registering another three firms is under way. The
ultimate target is to relieve viable problematic firms from their
old  financial  burdens  and  ensure  both  the  appropriate  level  of
capital and the most efficient capital structure  for their future
welfare. Whether the ownership of viable firms will be transferred
to the private sector is still not clear.  It is probable that some
of  them  (those  considered  to  be  of  strategic  importance)  will
remain under direct state control.
Regarding  the  non-viable  firms,  the  procedure  for  their
liquidation has  advanced  during the  last year.  Three  firms have
already been sold through an auction-sale system.  The liquidation
of the rest of the non-viable firms is progressing and is expected
to be completed soon for most of them.
As  part  of  the  rehabilitation  process  many  firms  need  a
restructuring  of  existing  operations.  Being  under  financial
distress  for a number of years,  "problematic"  companies have not
made  adequate  investments  in  new  machinery  and  therefore  their
capacity is obsolete.  Promoting efficiency and reducing production
costs reqviArs,  in some cases,  extensive replacement of machinery
and reconsideration of existing production structures.  In some of
the  biggest  problematic  firms,  parts  of  their  operations  could
become profitable while the rest have poor prospects.  Reducing the
production of some products or even completely abandoning them may
be the best solution in some cases.
Greater attention needs also to be paid to the organizatioral
and management structures.  There are cases where size has been a
barrier  to  development.  While  the  average  size  of  Greek
manufacturing companies is small and mergers seem to be a suitable
solution  to  improve  profitability,  the  problematic  firms  are
typically  big,  in  many  cases  the  biggest  in  their  sector.  Size
might thus be a problem in some cases and splitting operations the
appropriate action.  In  at  least  one  case  (the  bi-gest  textile
industry in the country) this solution is being implemented,  aimed
at promoting flexibility and specialization of the emerging smaller
units.  Irrespective of other appropriate changes,  the appointment
27of professional  management  is a necessary condition for ensuring
the future efficient administration of viable problematic firms.
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